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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED BY/RELEASE AUTHORITY:

RICHARD ZORN, SENIOR REVIEWER

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL

DATE: May 27, 1968

SUBJECT: DATE: JANUARY 28, 2020
Indian Position on NPT (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Anthony Duff, Head South Asian Division, Commonwealth Relations Office

Mr. K. Michael Wilford, Counselor, British Embassy

Mr. P. Roy Spendlove, First Secretary, British Embassy

Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Acting Assistant Director, ACDA/IR

Mr. Carleton Coon, NEA/INC

COPIES TO: Mr. Arthur M. Stillman, ACDA/IR

ACDA (17)

White House-Mr. Keeny

US Mission GENEVA

EUR/BMI

DOD/ISA-Dr. Halperin

DISDEL (3)

NEA/INC

AEC-Mr. Labowitz

USUN New York (2)

RPM

Amembassy LONDON

G/PM

Amembassy NEW DELHI

IO/UNP

INR (10)

Mr. Duff said that the UK assessment as of May 12 was that India would not sign the NPT and that this decision had been taken primarily for internal political reasons. The GOI believes its position is tenable externally and desirable internally. Despite the GOI public posture favoring modifications of the treaty, the government would in fact be embarrassed by modifications designed to secure Indian adherence. It is unlikely that the Indian position would be altered even if it were isolated on the NPT.

Mr. Gleysteen agreed with this assessment and said that we saw no "give" in the GOI position at present. The GOI had informed us that while it would not sign the treaty in its present form, it would not obstruct progress on the treaty in New York. The GOI has, in fact, remained passive at the GA aside from the speech by Ambassador Husain opposing the treaty. Mr. Gleysteen felt that the GOI might have been able to sign a year ago but now finds that it is politically expedient to oppose the treaty.

Mr. Gleysteen added that the Indians probably feel that there is a prestige aspect associated with maintaining an option to develop nuclear weapons even though the Indians say they have no intention of so doing. Mr. Duff felt that the Indians view the apparently

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contradictory policy, of refusing to sign the NPT while not developing nuclear weapons, as tenable.

In a discussion of Pakistan attitudes, Mr. Gleysteen said that we do not know whether the GOP will sign although it clearly favors the NPT. He pointed out that all of the Arab countries, except Algeria, are supporting the NPT since they recognize that this will bring pressure on Israel. The GOP could adopt a similar policy vis-a-vis India. It was agreed that Pakistan would not be influenced by Afghanistan and Iran (among the co-sponsors of the GA resolution) since it is primarily concerned about India. Pakistan also has an interest in the non-nuclear conference, which it had originally sponsored, thereby qualifying support for the NPT at the GA.

Mr. Duff inquired about our views on ENDC membership, especially whether Pakistan might seek to become a member and whether there might be pressure to remove India. Mr. Gleysteen said that the delicate question of ENDC membership may be raised this summer. Japan would be an obvious candidate. It was unrealistic, however, to contemplate that India would be replaced or that Pakistan would become a member. The ENDC has played an effective role in bringing about arms control measures because it is small and expert. While the NPT was under active negotiation, we succeeded in avoiding polemical East-West exchanges. This proved the value of freeing the ENDC from debates on Kashmir and other regional disputes.

Mr. Duff asked if the ENDC might consider arms shipments to third countries. Mr. Gleysteen said that the Committee probably would have this question on its agenda some time in the future. However, he noted that at present, the US is not even able to have a suppliers' agreement with its allies on this subject.

In response to a question, Mr. Gleysteen said that the ENDC will be under pressure to consider nuclear disarmament measures next, including limitations on strategic delivery vehicles, comprehensive test ban, and cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Conclusion of the NPT should improve the atmosphere for progress on such arms control measures. During the next phase of international negotiations on arms control, the US, UK and USSR should share an interest in promoting adherence to and ratification of the NPT by problem countries, including India.

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Regarding security assurances, Mr. Gleysteen said that there may be a problem in obtaining Security Council approval for the resolution. India and Pakistan are members and it is possible that both of these countries, as well as others, such as France and Brazil, would abstain on the resolution. We believe it would be advantageous to obtain favorable Security Council action before the non-nuclear conference in order to avoid pressure for a non-use provision which the UK and, to a lesser extent, the US oppose.

Mr. Coon referred to the L.K. Jha mission last year which explored the question of security assurances with the US and the USSR. The GOI has carefully sought to be dissociated from the Jha mission on the basis that security assurances are not related to the GOI decision on NPT.

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